Abstract. An important question in designing cryptographic functions including substitution boxes (S-boxes) is the relationships among the various nonlinearity criteria each of which indicates the strength or weakness of a cryptographic function against a particular type of cryptanalytic attacks. In this paper we reveal, for the rst time, interesting connections among the strict avalanche characteristics, di erential characteristics, linear structures and nonlinearity of quadratic S-boxes. In addition, we show that our proof techniques allow us to treat in a uni ed fashion all quadratic permutations, regardless of the underlying construction methods. This greatly simpli es the proofs for a number of known results on nonlinearity characteristics of quadratic permutations. As a by-product, we obtain a negative answer to an open problem regarding the existence of di erentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations on an even dimensional vector space.
a n b n , where multiplication and addition are over GF (2) . In this paper we consider functions from V n to GF(2) (or simply functions on V n ). We are particularly interested in functions whose algebraic degrees are 2, also called quadratic functions. These functions take the form of a 00 X 1 i;j n a ij x i x j , where a ij is an element from GF (2) , while x i is a variable in GF (2) . Let An a ne function f on V n is a function that takes the form of f = a 1 x 1 a n x n c, where a j ; c 2 GF(2), j = 1; 2; : : :; n. >From the de nition, it can be seen that bent functions on V n exist only when n is even. Another fact is that bent functions are not balanced, hence not directly applicable in most computer and communications security practices. Dillon presented a nice exposition of bent functions in 7] . In particular, he showed that bent functions can be characterized in various ways:
Lemma2. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) f is bent.
(ii) h ;`i = 2 1 2 n for any a ne sequence`of length 2 n , where is the sequence of f.
(iii) f(x) f(x ) is balanced for any non-zero vector 2 V n , where x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ).
The strict avalanche criterion (SAC) was rst introduced by Webster and Tavares 24, 25] when studying the design of cryptographically strong substitution boxes (S-boxes).
De nition 3. A function f on V n is said to satisfy the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) if f(x) f(x ) is balanced for all 2 V n with W( ) = 1, where x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ).
It is widely accepted that the component functions of an S-box employed by a modern block cipher should all satisfy the SAC. A general technique for constructing SAC-ful lling cryptographic functions can be found in 22] .
While the SAC measures the avalanche characteristics of a function, the linear structure is a concept that in a sense complements the former, namely, it indicates the straightness of a function.
De nition 4. Let f be a function on V n . A vector 2 V n is called a linear structure of f if f(x) f(x ) is a constant.
Evertse apparently was the rst person who studied implications of linear structures (in a sense broader than ours) on the security of encryption algorithms 8]. By de nition, the zero vector in V n is a linear structure of all functions on V n . It is not hard to see that the linear structures of a function f form a linear subspace of V n . The dimension of the subspace is called the linearity dimension of f. Clearly, the linearity dimension of a function on V n is bounded from the above by n, with the a ne functions achieving the maximum dimension n. It is bounded from the below by 0 when n is even and by 1 when n is odd. The lower bound 0 is achieved only by bent functions that have the zero vector as their only linear structure, while 1 can be achieved by functions that have only two linear structures (one is the zero vector and the other is a nonzero vector). Examples of the latter are those obtained by concatenating two bent functions (see 19, 23] ).
In mathematical terms, an n s S-box (i.e., with n input bits and s output bits), can be described as a mapping from V n to V s (n s). To avoid trivial statistical attacks, an S-box F should be regular, namely, F(x) should run through all vectors in V s each 2 n?s times while x runs through V n once. Note that an n n S-box is a permutation on V n and always regular.
Regularity of an n s S-box F can be characterized by the balance of nonzero A proof for the theorem will be given in the full version. It seems to the authors that the proof for the case of n = s as described in 7] can not be directly adapted to the general case of n > s, and hence the extension presented here is not trivial. The next criterion is the nonlinearity that indicates the Hamming distance between a function and all the a ne functions.
De nition 6. Given two functions f and g on V n , the Hamming distance between them, denoted by d(f; g), is de ned as the Hamming weight of the truth table of the function f(x) g(x), where x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ). The nonlinearity of f, denoted by N f , is the minimal Hamming distance between f and all a ne functions on V n , i.e., N f = min i=1;2;:::;2 n+1 d(f; ' i ) where ' 1 , ' 2 , : : :, ' 2 n+1 denote the a ne functions on V n .
The above de nition can be extended to the case of mappings, by de ning the nonlinearity of a mapping from V n to V s as the minimum among the nonlinearities of nonzero linear combinations of the component functions.
The nonlinearity of a function f on V n has been known to be bounded from the above by 2 n?1 ? 2 bent functions. Constructions for highly nonlinear balanced functions can be found in 19, 23] .
Nonlinearity has been considered to be an important criterion. Recent advances in Linear cryptanalysis put forward by Matsui 10, 11] have further made it explicit that nonlinearity is not just important, but essential to DES-like block encryption algorithms. Linear cryptanalysis exploits the low nonlinearity of S-boxes employed by a block cipher, and it has been successfully applied in attacking FEAL and DES. In 21] , it has been shown that to immunize an S-box against linear cryptanalysis, it su ces for the Hamming distance between each nonzero linear combination of the component functions and each a ne function not to deviate too far from 2 n?1 , namely, an S-box is immune to linear cryptanalysis if the nonlinearity of each nonzero linear combination of its component functions is high.
Finally we consider a nonlinearity criterion that measures the strength of an S-box against di erential cryptanalysis 3, 4]. The essence of a di erential attack is that it exploits particular entries in the di erence distribution tables of S-boxes employed by a block cipher. The di erence distribution table of an n s S-box is a 2 n 2 s matrix. The rows of the matrix, indexed by the vectors in V n , represent the change in the input, while the columns, indexed by the vectors in V s , represent the change in the output of the S-box. An entry in the table indexed by ( ; ) indicates the number of input vectors which, when changed by (in the sense of bit-wise XOR), result in a change in the output by (also in the sense of bit-wise XOR).
Note that an entry in a di erence distribution table can only take an even value, the sum of the values in a row is always 2 n , and the rst row is always (2 n ; 0; : : : ; 0). As entries with higher values in the table are particularly useful to di erential cryptanalysis, a necessary condition for an S-box to be immune to di erential cryptanalysis is that it does not have large values in its di erential distribution table (not counting the rst entry in the rst row).
De nition 7. Let F be an n s S-box, where n s. Let be the largest value in di erential distribution table of the S-box (not counting the rst entry in the rst row), namely, = max 2Vn; 6 =0 max 2Vs jfxjF(x) F(x ) = gj:
Then F is said to be di erentially -uniform, and accordingly, is called the di erential uniformity of f.
Obviously the di erential uniformity of an n s S-box is constrained by 2 n?s 2 n . Extensive research has been carried out in constructing di erentially -uniform S-boxes with a low 13, 1, 14, 16, 15, 2]. Some constructions, in particular those based on permutation polynomials on nite elds, are simple and elegant. However, caution must be taken with De nition 7. In particular, it should be noted that low di erential uniformity (a small ) is only a necessary, but not a su cient condition for immunity to di erential attacks. This is shown by the fact that S-boxes constructed in 13, 1] are extremely weak to di erential attacks, despite that they achieve the lowest possible di erential uniformity = 2 n?s 4, 5, 21] . A more complete measurement is the robustness introduced in 21]. The reader is directed to that paper for a comprehensive treatment of this subject.
Note that an n s S-box achieves the lowest possible di erential uniformity = 2 n?s if and only if it has a at di erence distribution table. As has been noticed by many researchers (see for instance Page 62 of 4]), a at di erence distribution table is not associated with a regular S-box. This result, together with a formal proof, is now given explicitly. We have discussed various cryptographic properties including the algebraic degree, the SAC, the linear structure, the regularity, the nonlinearity and the di erential uniformity. As is stated in the following lemmas, some properties are invariant under a nonsingular linear transformation.
Lemma 9. Let f be a function on V n , A be a nonsingular matrix of order n over GF (2) , and let g(x) = f(xA). Then f and g have the same algebraic degree, nonlinearity and linearity dimension.
The next lemma was pointed out in Section 5.3 of 21]. It was also noticed by Beth and Ding in 2]. The lemma is followed by a short formal proof for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 10. Let F be a mapping from V n to V s , where n s, A be a nonsingular matrix of order n over GF (2) , and B be a nonsingular matrix of order s over GF (2) . Let G(x) = F(xA) and H(x) = F(x)B, where x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ). Note that A is applied to the input, while B to the output of F. Then 
Cryptographic Properties of Quadratic S-boxes
In this section we reveal interesting relationships among the di erence distribution table, linear structures, nonlinearity and SAC of S-boxes whose component functions are all quadratic (or simply, quadratic S-boxes).
Linear Structure vs Nonlinearity
Consider a quadratic function f on V n . Then f(x) f(x ) is a ne, where x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) and 2 V n . Assume that f does not have nonzero linear structures. Then for any nonzero 2 V n , f(x) f(x ) is a nonzero a ne function, hence balanced. By Part (iii) of Lemma 2, f is bent. Thus we have:
Lemma11. If a quadratic function f on V n has no nonzero linear structures, then f is bent and n is even.
The following lemma is a useful tool in calculating the nonlinearity of functions obtained via Kronecker product. We now examine how the nonlinearity of a function on V n relates to the linearity dimension of the function.
Let g be a (not necessarily quadratic) function on V n , f 1 ; : : : ; `g be a basis of the subspace consisting of the linear structures of g. f 1 ; : : : ; `g can be extended to f 1 ; : : : ; `; `+1 ; : : : ; n g such that the latter is a basis of V n . Now let B be a nonsingular matrix with i as its ith row, and let g (x) = g(xB). By Lemma 9, g and g have the same linearity dimension, algebraic degree and nonlinearity. Thus the question is transformed into the discussion of g . Let e i be the vector in V n whose ith coordinate is one and others are zero. 
where x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), y = (x 1 ; : : : ; x`), z = (x`+ 1 ; : : : ; x n ), m j 6 = 0, the algebraic degree of each r j is at least 1 and r j 6 = r i for j 6 = i. 
Since all vectors in V`are linear structures of q, q is an a ne function on V`. As the linearity dimension of g is also`, r must be a function on V n?`t hat does not have nonzero linear structures. By Lemmas 9 and 12, we have N g = N g = 2`N r .
This is precisely what Proposition 3 of 14] states.
As a special case, suppose that g in the above discussions is quadratic. Then the function r in (2) is a quadratic function on V n?`w ith no nonzero linear structures. By Lemma 11, r is a bent function on V n?`w hose nonlinearity is N r = 2 n?`?1 ? 2 1 2 (n?`)?1 . Thus we have: Theorem 13. Let g be a function on V n whose algebraic degree is at most 2.
Denote by`the linearity dimension of g. Then The lower bound on nonlinearity in Theorem 13 can be straightforwardly translated into that for quadratic (not necessarily regular) n s S-boxes (n s). Now we take a closer look at the nonlinearity of a quadratic function g on V n . As g is nonlinear, we have`< n, where`is the linearity dimension of g. In addition since g is quadratic, by (i) of Theorem 13, n ?`is even. Thus we havè n ? 2, and N g 2 n?1 ? 2 1 2 (n+`)?1 2 n?2 . This proves the following:
Corollary 14. The nonlinearity of a quadratic function on V n is at least 2 n?2 .
Corollary 14 is a bit surprising in the sense that it indicates that all quadratic functions are fairly nonlinear, and there is no quadratic function whose nonlinearity is between 0 and 2 n?2 (exclusive).
Di erence Distribution Table vs Linear Structure
First we show an interesting result stating that the number representing the di erential uniformity of a quadratic S-box must be a power of 2.
Theorem 15. Let be the di erential uniformity of a quadratic n s S-box. Then = 2 d for some n ? s d n. Furthermore, if the S-box is regular, then we have = 2 d for some n ? s + 1 d n.
Let F = (f 1 ; : : : ; f s ) be a regular quadratic n s S-box, and let g be a nonlinear combination of the component functions of F. Then it can be shown that g has at least one nonzero linear structure. To prove the claim, we assume that g has no nonzero linear structures. Then by Lemma 11, g is a bent function. This contradicts the fact that F is regular and that the nonzero linear combinations of its component functions are all balanced quadratic or a ne functions and hence have linear structures.
Next we show that the di erential uniformity of an S-box is closely related to the number of linear structures of an nonzero linear combinations of the component functions of the S-box. structures. This coincides with our intuition that the nonlinearity of an S-box grows with the strength of its immunity to di erential attacks. (2) , such that all component functions of (g j1 (xA); : : : ; g js (xA)) satisfy the SAC. Furthermore, as each g j is a nonzero linear combination of f 1 , : : :, f s , there is a nonsingular matrix B of order s over GF (2) such that (g j1 (x); : : : ; g js (x)) = (f 1 (x); : : : ; f s (x))B.
Di erence Distribution
Accordingly, by Lemma 10, (x) = F(xA)B = (f 1 (xA); : : : ; f s (xA))B = ( 1 (x); : : : ; s (x)) is a di erentially -uniform regular quadratic n s S-box, where each component function j satis es the SAC.
In Theorem 17, when the di erential uniformity = 2 n?s+t is small, the parameter t is also small, and the condition s 2 s?t?2 is readily satis ed.
Equivalently we can say that S-boxes strong against di erential attacks are also SAC-ful lling, subject to a nonsingular linear transformation. Again, this coincides with our intuition.
A Uni ed Treatment of Quadratic Permutations
This section is concerned with di erentially 2-uniform quadratic n n S-boxes.
Since such an S-box F is a permutation, F(x) F(x ) takes a vector two times or does not take it, while x runs through V n once. F has the following property: for any nonzero vector 2 V n , F(x) F(x ) runs through 2 n?1 vectors in V n , each twice, but not through the other 2 n?1 vectors, while x runs through V n .
Although there are many question marks regarding the applicability of differentially 2-uniform quadratic n n S-boxes in computer security practices, primarily due to their low algebraic degree, these S-boxes have received extensive research in the past years 17, 16, 6, 2, 15] and hence deserve our special attention. These S-boxes appear in various forms and researchers have employed di erent techniques, some of which are rather sophisticated, to prove their nonlinearity characteristics. By re ning our proof techniques described in Section 2, we will show in this section that all di erentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations, no matter how they are constructed, have the same nonlinearity and can be transformed into SAC-ful lling S-boxes. This greatly simpli es the proofs for a number of known results. (ii) any nonzero linear combination of f 1 ; : : : ; f n , say g(x) = P n j=1 c j f j (x), has a unique nonzero linear structure.
(iii) each nonzero vector in V n is the linear structure of a unique nonzero linear combination of f 1 ; : : : ; f n .
(iv) F is di erentially 2-uniform, i.e. for each nonzero vector 2 V n , F(x)
F(x ) runs through half of the vectors in V n while x runs through V n . (v) every nonzero linear combination of the component functions, say g, can be expressed as g(x) = xCx T , where x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), C is a matrix over GF (2) and the rank of C C T is n ? 1.
Proof. The equivalence of (i) and ( (3) that is not balanced. Since f j is quadratic, (3) is a ne. Thus (3) must be a constant. Write g (x) = P n j=1 c j f j (x). Then is a nonzero linear structure of g . Thus each has at least one edge associated with it. In summary, each g j has at least one edge associated with it, and so does each j . As both sides of the bipartite graph have the same number of edges, (ii) and (iii) must stand in parallel.
The equivalence of (iii) and (iv): First we note that the di erential uniformity of a permutation is at least 2. Let s = n and t = 1. Then By Theorem 16, F is di erential 2-uniform if and only if each nonzero vector in V n is the linear structure of at most one nonzero linear combination of f 1 ; : : : ; f n . In the proof of the equivalence of (ii) and (iii), it is has been shown that each nonzero vector in V n is a linear structure of at least one nonzero linear combination of the component functions. Thus F is di erential 2-uniform if and only if each nonzero vector in V n is the linear structure of a unique nonzero linear combination of the component functions.
The equivalence of (iv) and (v): Note that for any quadratic function g on V n , there exists an n n matrix C on GF(2) such that g(x) = xCx T . In 16], where the statement (v) is called the property (P), Nyberg and Knudsen proved that (v) implies (iv). We now show that the opposite is also true. Suppose that F is a di erentially 2-uniform permutation on V n . Let g be a nonzero linear combination of the component functions, and let C a matrix such that g(x) = xCx T . By (ii), we have`= 1, where`is the linearity dimension of g. By Proposition 4 of 14], the linearity dimension of g and the rank of C C T satisfy the following relation:`= n?rank(C C T ). Hence we have rank(C C T ) = n?1, namely (iv) implies (v). This proves the equivalence of (iv) and (v is a di erentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation, where x 2 GF(2 n ),`, k and n are positive integers, and gcd(2 k + 1; 2 n ? 1) = gcd(k; n) = 1. Beth and Ding claim that their corollary indicates the existence of di erentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations on V n , n even. This seemingly contradicts the non-existence result shown in our Corollary 19. However, one can see that when n is even, k must be odd in order for gcd(k; n) = 1 to stand. On the other hand, if n is even and k is odd, then gcd(2 k +1; 2 n ?1) has 3 as a factor. Thus gcd(2 k +1; 2 n ?1) = gcd(k; n) = 1
can not stand for n even. In other words, Beth and Ding's corollary does not imply the existence of di erentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations on V n , n even.
The following result has been pointed out by these authors in 22]. It is included here, together with its proof, for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 20. Let F = (f 1 ; : : : ; f n ) (n 3) be a di erentially 2-uniform quadratic permutation. Then there exists a nonsingular matrix A of order n over GF (2) such that (x) = F(xA) = (f 1 (xA); : : : ; f n (xA)) = ( 1 (x); : : : ; n (x)) is also di erentially 2-uniform, and each component function j satis es the SAC.
Proof. When n 7, it directly follows from Theorem 17. The proof described below applies to all n 3.
Let denote the set of vectors such that f j f j (x ) is not balanced for some 1 j n. By (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 18, we have j j = n. Since j j < 2 n?1 for all n 3, by Theorem 2 of 22], there exists a nonsingular matrix A of order n over GF(2) that transforms F into a SAC-ful lling S-box.
Conclusion
We have proved that for quadratic S-boxes, there are close relationships among di erential uniformity, linear structures, nonlinearity and the SAC. We have shown that by using our proof techniques, all di erentially 2-uniform quadratic permutations can be treated in a uni ed fashion. In particular, general results regarding nonlinearity characteristics of these permutations are derived, regardless of the underlying methods for constructing the permutations. A future research direction is to extend the results to the more general case where component functions of an S-box can have an algebraic degree larger than 2. Another direction is to enlarge the scope of nonlinearity criteria examined so that it includes other cryptographic properties such as algebraic degree, propagation characteristics, and correlation immunity.
